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Introduction 
The 2011 Syrian uprising has generated considerable debate about alternative protest 
media spaces and oppositional news practices that have emerged in a rapidly changing media 
environment and a long-term violent conflict - a debate that has largely become entangled 
with broader concerns around theorizing the role of media in conflict. Many of these 
discussions have focused on the potential of alternative/radical/protest/counter-hegemonic 
media for citizen journalism (Wessels 2019), activism, voice, political participation, agency 
and empowerment, the production of counter-hegemonic narratives (Crilley 2017; Matar 
2016) as well as their role in the emergence of radically different political subjectivities often 
discussed, in Middle Eastern contexts, as products of liberated political imaginaries or as 
digital cultures of contention (Zayani 2015). These debates have also informed some studies 
around Arab women’s media work and activism and their foregrounding of gender questions 
in socio-political transformations, with some scholars, such as Radsch and Khamis (2013), 
arguing that Arab women’s digital activism had helped young women achieve leadership and 
visibility in the media, along with challenging mainstream (state or official) media narratives 
in relation to women, while others, such as Al-Rawi (2014), suggesting that the Arab Spring 
had helped launch digital feminist movements in predominantly patriarchal societies. Khamis 
(2018: 2) goes further in noting that just by engaging in multiple forms of struggle, Arab 
women contest and redefine “gendered spaces, politically, legally, and socially”, while 
Sreberny cautions that studies of women’s digital activism need to be more nuanced and 
consider connections between gendered subjectivities and other social identities, as well as 
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the relationship between women and the nation state which ultimately “hinge on broader 
issues of equality and power” (2018: 112).1  
In Syria, alternative protest media that burst into the Syrian public sphere at the 
beginning of the uprising without doubt provided Syrian women, as well as the wider 
population, with what Cammaerts (2012) calls ‘mediation opportunity structures’ to represent 
themselves, tell their own stories, exert agency, discuss socially taboo subjects in public and 
insert gender politics and practices into the agenda of the popular revolution. In doing so, 
these women built on pre-uprising processes that had seen the establishment of women 
associations and committees and formal and informal networks to challenge gender 
stereotypes, strengthen women’s status and seek to amend laws that discriminate against 
women (al-Aous 2013). Such informal networks included websites such as al-thawra 
(www.al-thawra-sy.com) and the Syrian Women Observatory (www.nesasy.org), which are 
examples of some of the first websites that have provided knowledge on gender identity, 
women’s lived conditions, improvement of women’s and children’s rights as well as youth, 
people with special needs, prisoners, environment, health and legal advice to women who 
suffer from domestic violence or threats to their lives (al-Aous 2013).   
Acknowledging the agential potential of alternative protest Syrian media platforms 
post-2011,2 this chapter moves out of discussions that focus on the role of these media for 
empowerment and agency or those that discuss the production of counter-hegemonic 
discourses. Instead, it uses the optic of liminality to address these platforms as essentially 
liminal spaces of war that provide new fields of possibilities for Syrian women (as well as 
other members of the society) to tell their own stories and experiences of the uprising, and to 
construct and imagine new political and social subjectivities.3 Liminality is a term that refers 
to events, processes, or individuals that are on the threshold of, or in the early stages of, new 
social processes, which anthropologist Victor Turner has theorized as stages of transition and 
in-between positions that liminal individuals occupy. For Turner, liminality is a position of 
social and structural ambiguity, or as “the Nay to all positive structural assertions, but as in 
some sense the source of them all, and, more than that, as a realm of pure possibility whence 
novel configurations of ideas and relations may arise” (Turner 1967: 97). In liminal 
conditions, such as uprisings, revolutions and war, subjects become removed from the 
“familiar space, the routine temporal order, or the structures of moral obligations and social 
ties… [and]… enter a liminal time/space … [in which] the transgression of norms and 
conventions becomes possible” (Yang 2000: 25), social markers disappear and subjects, 
differentiated along gender, sexual, ethnic, religious or racial lines, can imagine themselves 
as equal. This is because in situations when order and norms are dissolved and/or contested, 
lived experiences shape political consciousness and meaning making.4 Focusing on the 
concept of liminality in relation to media work during times of transition, Zizzi Papacharissi 
(2015) suggests that liminality allows media workers (journalists, editors, media managers, 
etc.) to engage in processes of transition through collaborative news co-creation, that she 
proposes is in itself liminal particularly because this form of engagement relies on the 
temporary dismantling of news rituals so as to be able to collectively (re)produce new ones. 
As she argues (2015:32):    
Liminality is a middle point in a dialogue about what is news, in a society. It is a 
transitional, but essential stage in finding one’s own place in the story and doing so 
from a position that allows autonomy and potential for agency. …[but]… in order for 
this dialogue to be rendered liminal, all previous hierarchy about what makes news 
must be abandoned, and therein lies the empowering potential of liminality….the 
very function of liminality is to abandon structure so as to permit activity that will 
result in the birthing of a new structure, and therein lie both potential empowerment 
and disempowerment. 
The concept of liminality is particularly relevant to addressing women’s media work 
in liminal conditions, such as the uprising turned war by the Syrian regime against all its 
opponents and characterized by upheaval and a breakdown in social order. To illustrate the 
argument, the chapter uses the example of Enab Baladi, one of the most prominent Syrian 
alternative media platforms that emerged following the March 2011 uprising, and draws on a 
select number of interviews with some of its female founders/media workers, who were 
involved in its creation from the beginning. The chapter is divided into two main sections: the 
first section discusses Enab Baladi as a liminal space of war that provides new fields of 
possibilities for women media workers to overturn structure and insert gender into the 
revolutionary agenda. The second section discusses how the protracted liminal state in Syria, 
exacerbated by the longevity and complexity of the war, is both ambiguous and precarious, 
and as such, provides new fields of possibilities for regime and other counter-revolutionary 
forces to re-instate social norms, re-institutionalize structure, suppress dissent and seek to re-
integrate liminal actors into pre-uprising social structures. The chapter concludes by 
suggesting that liminality can help us theorize the role of media and conflict in protracted 
conflicts without overtly emphasizing the potential of media in social and political conflicts 
and change, but to ground this potential in temporalities and socio-political contexts.  
Liminal spaces of war 
Enab Baladi, which means “the Grapes of My Country”, is one of many alternative media 
spaces and websites initiated by Syrian women in the context of the Syrian 2011 uprising – 
these include Souriatna, Oxygen newspaper, the Kibreet blog, the Dahnoon blog and Al Haq 
newspaper. While these media initiatives grew out of the Syrian uprising against oppression 
and economic deprivation that began in March 2011, they built on and extended a number of 
pre-uprising small and scattered initiatives that had also harnessed digital spaces to improve 
women’s social status as well as draw attention to the conditions of women in predominantly 
patriarchal societies. Many of these initiatives used the Internet and social media platforms to 
disseminate their views and fight patriarchy – for example Musawa (equality), an 
independent civil society organization founded in 2009 by a group of Syrian women to fight 
gender-discrimination and enable effective participation of women in the political, social, 
economic and cultural spheres of Syrian society and the collective Syrian Women for the 
Syrian Intifada, a network of women initially aimed at supporting families of detainees and 
martyrs, which later broadened its activities to support grassroots’ activists who had lost their 
jobs or of those who had gone into hiding for their political stances.  
            Enab Baladi started as a weekly printed newspaper distributed by hand with the aim 
of disseminating news and information of the popular uprising and to counter the regime’s 
narrative which had dominated the media sector for more than 40 decades. The paper was 
founded by young Syrian female and male activists, including the co-author of this chapter 
Kholoud Helmi, in the Syrian town of Daraya, one of the main Syrian towns where popular 
protests for political and human rights began. Since its foundation, the newspaper has focused 
on publishing first-hand personal narratives of the uprising and of ordinary people’s lived 
experiences, aspirations and needs as well as reports on women’s involvement and 
participation in the uprising and in building collaborative protest networks bringing together 
opposition actors. During its foundation phase, various roles and responsibilities, such as 
interviewing, editing, assigning news stories and reporting from the battleground, were 
distributed in basic ways among the amateur founders, with some individuals taking on 
several reporting and editorial duties at the same time. Organization of tasks was simple and 
voluntary and questions of journalistic professionalism in news gathering and news telling 
were not pivotal particularly at a time when holding a camera was considered a state crime. 
Most activities and media work were underground, compared to later stages, where teams 
were more organized and structures more developed. By 2019, buffeted by support from the 
EU and by international recognition of its contribution, Enab Baladi had developed into one 
of the most important independent Syrian media institutions, published both in print in 
Turkey and shipped to northern parts of Syria where some opposition strongholds remain and 
online through its website and Facebook page which attract about two million page views a 
month.5 
             In its early stages, Enab Baladi ‘s media workers were mainly composed of 
volunteers and citizen journalists, including women, who focused on telling the stories of 
ordinary lives in conflict and providing eyewitness accounts of unfolding events –  tasks 
which one of its female co-founders, Afraa Sharbaji (2018), said in an interview were 
essentially concerned with providing facts and information of the unfolding events and “an 
alternative view to that of the regime’s while paying particular attention to the Syrian people, 
their fears, struggles, dreams and aspirations”. The fact that women were some of the main 
founders influenced the stories they chose to tell and had access to, particularly because 
Syrian women were willing to speak to the female journalists about sensitive topics, 
including rape by security forces and militias. But this fact also reflected, according to our 
informants, a deep change in popular perceptions towards women evident in the early days of 
the uprising.6 These perceptions, as Manal Shakashiro (2018), a Enab Baladi reporter and co-
founder, said were “not only witnessed in women’s media work, which brought them 
visibility, but also in other public roles women took on”. For co-author of this chapter and co-
founder of Enab Baladi, Kholoud Helmi, women, particularly those who had been 
marginalized before or who come from conservative and low-income backgrounds, were 
encouraged into taking new social and public roles, including media work, because of the 
transformative potential of the uprising as well as support from male colleagues and male 
family members, helping them gain recognition in their local communities as they established 
networks with other communities for social and political support.7 As she said: “Personally, I 
was empowered because (the revolution) showed me I could speak up and ask for my rights 
and the rights of others and allowed me to challenge gender norms institutionalized under a 
dictatorship” (Helmi 2018), underlining how these women occupied liminal positions as a 
stage of transition and in-between positions during times of upheaval. 
           During that stage8 and before the conflict became more violent, most of the informants 
said they did not feel they were different from men, particularly because they were all united 
by similar revolutionary goals, reflecting how liminal conditions also helped remove them 
from the “familiar space, the routine temporal order, or the structures of moral obligations 
and social ties…” and enter a liminal media space (Enab Baladi) in which transgression of 
norms and conventions became possible, social markers disappeared and subjects were 
imagined as equal. All the interviewees said that it was the revolutionary agenda that spurred 
their activism in ways that did not exist before – for example, they found themselves 
assuming influential, decision-making roles as activists, journalists, human rights defenders 
and advocates, and they became aware of other roles they could take outside their household, 
blurring the public/private divide. For Sharbaji, it was during this stage that her imagination 
of what it meant to be a Syrian woman contested the imagined Syrian woman imposed by the 
ruling Ba’ath Party’s ideologies. As she put it, “I was able to know what it means to be a 
Syrian woman because I was able to have my voice heard and to freely participate in its 
political and social life” (Sharbaji 2018).   
            It is in this sense that Enab Baladi can be understood, as we propose, as a liminal 
space of war in which women media workers engaged in practices and imagined themselves 
as subjects from a liminal point of access (or an in-between position), and it is from that 
position that they were able to insert gender into the agenda of the uprising. For example, 
they discussed socially taboo subjects, such as sexual violence against women (a common 
practice even before the uprising) (see The Day After 2018); women’s lives in conflict, not 
only as mothers, daughters or sisters, but as equal social actors with men; the regime’s 
violations against women and Islamic State’s brutal punishment of women who do not meet 
the strict Islamic dress code it imposed or those who appeared in public. Indeed, the mere 
coverage of such sensitive issues defined alternative media spaces as new spaces for anti-
structure and spaces in which social norms can be challenged, as evidenced in the stories and 
reports the newspaper covered since 2012 (for examples of these stories, see Enab Baladi 
(2019). Importantly, as we suggest that Enab Baladi as a liminal space of war provides new 
possibilities for making visible the ways in which Syrian women carry on everyday life 
activities without male members to support them, the ways women refugees take the lead in 
caring for families in refugee camps and displacement sites, the use of women as weapons of 
war, the increasing practices of taking women as slaves and the practice of forcing young 
female orphans into early marriage, topics that are normally considered taboo in male-
dominated society (Enab Baladi 2017). 
 
Patriarchy and ideology 
A deep understanding of how liminal spaces of war, such as Enab Baladi, provided new 
possibilities for Syrian women during conflict cannot be fully understood without discussing 
gender relations and ideologies and the social, political and economic context in Syria pre-
2011, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Briefly however, in her co-edited book 
Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance (2010), 
Sanja Kelly suggests that in Syria, “women had been treated as subordinate to men in the 
highly patriarchal culture, and social customs place gender-based restrictions on their rights” 
(Kelly 2010: 479). In Syria, men have traditionally dominated formal spaces, like politics, 
academics or religion, while most women have been more present in informal spaces, like the 
family, households and in social community work. Even in the relative normality of life 
before the war in Syria, women suffered from institutional discrimination, particularly in 
relation to questions of citizenship, custody of children (after divorce or separation), freedom 
of movement, and basic rights (Syrian women are not allowed to pass on their nationality to 
their children if married to non-Syrian men, whereas men have this right. Syrian woman 
cannot travel without their husband’s approval, while men can. In addition, Syrian women of 
all ages are required to have male guardians to contract their marriages, while adult men are 
free to contract their own marriages).  
             Broadly speaking, institutionalized gender norms and imbalances in gender structures 
extended to the media work women undertook in various media institutions that had been 
regulated and controlled by the Ba’thist Syrian regime since it came to power in 1963. These 
media institutions, such as the three main newspapers Tishreen, Al-Ba’ath, and Al-Thawra, 
along with the Syrian Arab News Agency, state radio, and television, did not allow much 
visibility or voice to women activists, restricting their attention to well-known women such as 
first lady Asma al-Assad or those who held official positions in the government, including 
membership of parliament. Indeed, despite the fact that Syrian women’s political struggles 
and their vital participation in the anti-colonial independence movement had gained them the 
right to vote in 1949, a majority of women continued to have to make difficult choices about 
what roles to play within the (largely patriarchal) Syrian society controlled and regulated by 
the nationalist discourse of the ruling Ba’th Party as well as the regime’s broader project of 
mass mobilization and modernization (Wedeen 1999; Matar 2019) which allowed it to 
maintain structural control of women’s organizations (Meininghaus 2016).  While on the face 
it, the project was committed to improving women’s conditions and achieving the regime’s 
promise of gender equality, it did not represent any ideological commitment to a profound 
change in the nature of gender relations in Syrian society or the elimination of legislative 
discrimination against women (Kelly and Breslin 2010), which, along with the exclusion of 
women from the Syrian nationalist narrative, has served to maintain power relations and 
bolster gendered hierarchies in the national imagination while fragmenting women’s efforts 
to form independent women’s movements. 
           Like other nation-states in the Arab world, women in Syria had often been used as 
symbols of the nation’s development and modernization plans and represented in national 
discourse as the mothers, daughters or sisters of the Syrian Arab nation, thus concealing 
gender inequalities by attempting to justify them on the basis of family, religion, history, or 
other cultural terms. The symbolic connection between the idea of woman and the idea of 
nation and the use of women as symbols of nations by nationalist and liberationist 
movements has been critical to the gendering of women’s membership in national 
communities (Joseph 2010). Sara Ruddick (1997: 213) suggests that the association of 
motherhood with nation and fatherhood with state is dangerous, bringing in “the worst of 
fatherhood: a right, often conjoined with real power, to intrude, humiliate, exploit, and 
assault”. While the forms of patriarchy change, the linkage of woman/mother to nation and 
man/father to state reinforces the production of gendered hierarchy and facilitates the 
institutionalization of gendered citizenship in state-building projects. In the original 
discourses and policies of the Syrian Ba’th Party, women were constructed and imagined as 
‘national subjects’ (own emphasis) who supposedly were allocated the same rights and duties 
as their male compatriots, a discourse that represented a specific form of ‘state feminism’ 
under the largely secularist discourse of the regime (see Sparre 2008). This form of state 
feminism constructed an image of the ideal Syrian woman as a modern, unveiled, educated 
and emancipated woman who performed citizenship and national duties as stipulated by the 
Ba’th Party rhetoric about who is a “good citizen” (Wedeen 2013) a discourse disseminated 
in the regime-controlled media and which depicted good women citizens as outgoing, free 
and modern that occupy social roles. As one of our informants, Noura al-Jizawi (2018) 
suggested, such a discourse extended to narratives of what it meant to be a successful woman 
as that woman who contributed to and worked within regime-sanctioned structures, such as 
the General Union of Syrian Women. Prominent examples of these women are Najah al-Attar 
who served as minister of culture, and was appointed Vice-President in 2006, an 
unprecedented move in the Arab World, and Buthaina Sha’aban, a member of the regime’s 
political elites and political media adviser to the Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. In the 
official media—and the private media related to the regime—women were portrayed in three 
main ways: as wives and mothers; as modern, outgoing women who worked mainly in art and 
as hardworking women working in rural environments. After the Syrian uprising in March 
2011, state media began to change some stereotypical images of Syrian women, representing 
them as having a key role in the regime’s war against opponents - for example, successful 
and national Syrian women were discussed as those who send their sons to join the Syrian 
army to defend the country against what it called enemies. These discourses did not mean 
women were free to participate in independent women’s movements nor that women 
concerns were discussed in the official state-run Syrian media.  
Liminal ambiguity 
It was not until the uprising that Syrian women felt empowered to challenge structural 
limitations and gendered discourses as part of broader processes calling for change and more 
political and social rights became possible, and it was during the early more peaceful stages 
of the popular protests that alternative protest media provided them with the spaces to contest 
norms and resist authoritarian power. As al-Jizawi said, Enab Baladi allowed her and other 
Syrian women to do things differently, move out of private places and thrust themselves into 
the public sphere. Another informant Manal Shakashiro went further to suggest that Enab 
Baladi was in itself similar to an “intifada” (uprising), providing a space for acts of 
transgression and anti-structure from which to engage in public acts of defiance against social 
norms and construct new ways of imagining what it means to be a Syrian woman. It is not 
surprising that revolutionary processes open new social and political spaces for women. 
Indeed, as Nadje al-Ali (2012: 28) writes,   
 
 If we speak of the Middle East, the most commonly cited examples are the 
Egyptian anti-colonial and independence movement at the turn of the 
twentieth century that gave rise to the Egyptian women’s movement; the 
Algerian war of independence in the time of French colonialism; and the 
Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation. Yet, history also teaches us that 
during political transitions, women are regularly marginalized and tend to lose 
many of the gains they might have acquired, or have been promised, at the 
height of a revolutionary struggle….  the issue is not only the lack or very 
limited representation of women in crucial transitional bodies, such as the 
constitutional review committee, but perhaps more significantly, we see 
women’s rights being actively violated and women’s and gender-based issues 
sidelined, occasionally even ridiculed, sometimes by women themselves. 
Indeed, as the popular protests shifted towards a violent stage of militarization which 
witnessed extreme violence and destruction, an increased risk of kidnapping, forced 
displacement, rape, sexual violence, torture and even enslavement, women began to 
experience marginalization in different ways. For our informants, gendered differentiations 
began to re-impose themselves in the newsroom and organizational practices, practices which 
coincided with the re-emergence of traditional normative beliefs about gender and the role of 
women in society along with the discursive instrumentalization of gender by various actors as 
part of their ideological battles over power.9 In the newsroom, as some of our informants 
said, gendered differentiations manifested themselves in the allocation of tasks and positions, 
which saw a downgrading of women’s roles from managers and decision-makers and the re-
imposition of binaries between the public and private. 
The seven women we interviewed for this chapter were some of the early pioneers 
who participated in creating media outlets after the 2011 revolution and for a short period of 
time had leading roles and responsibilities in Enab Baladi and other alternative protest media 
platforms. For co-author and media activist Helmi, gendering differentiations reasserted 
themselves in different ways and diverse spaces:  
Even when we took part in demonstrations, we began to hear voices calling on 
women not to participate in the demonstrations. In the media, we began to see men 
taking over leading roles, such as chief executive officers, editors in chief and 
managing editors. The change also happened on the ideological level when most of 
the media began to change the discourse … for example, we saw men reporters 
writing more about military issues and hard news and rarely focused on ordinary 
people’ stories and experiences.  
Gendering practices also began to be felt in the field. For example, when seeking to 
interview ordinary people and members of the opposition, Helmi reported that one young 
man, affiliated to the oppositional Free Syrian Army asked for a male reporter to speak to 
rather than her. Another informant Manal Shakashiro said men did not take her seriously as a 
woman and some of those she interviewed requested that a man be sent to talk to them 
instead. For her, male colleagues took over leading positions in the newsroom because it was 
more socially acceptable for men to be in the same place operating together, while it was not 
socially acceptable for a woman to work alongside a man. With increasing violence, many of 
the female journalists and founders left for Turkey where they established an office in 
Istanbul in 2014 and connected with international organizations ready to give training and 
funding to media organizations in Syria.  
Five of the women we interviewed for this chapter come from relatively conservative 
backgrounds where women had traditionally been expected to remain at home, but all said 
they were fully supported by their families to engage in opposition acts against the regime at 
the beginning of the uprising. Three of those interviewed belong to families that opposed the 
regime before 2011 and several come from vulnerable socio-economic backgrounds, 
corresponding to the findings of a recent report on alternative media platforms in Syria which 
showed that on average a high proportion of Syrian women media workers came from 
vulnerable socio-economic backgrounds (SFJN 2016). Most of the informants spoke of the 
challenges they faced following the escalation of violence, which brought new security 
challenges to the female journalists and their families. With increasing militarization of the 
conflict and the involvement of extremist religious groups, freedom of expression was 
curtailed and women media workers, particularly those with leading media positions, faced 
the additional threat of risk to their reputation and lives. Mais Qat, 30, a journalist who 
cofounded Rozana Radio, said: “Being a woman who works with a lot of men during times of 
war, where violence and aggression are the dominating language in the street and work 
offices as well; it is a big challenge that I faced” (Qat 2018)  
According to the report ‘Women in Emerging Syrian Media: 2011-2016’ (SFJN 
2016), on average, 54% of the workforce of what it called Emerging Syrian media in radio 
outlets were women, and over a third of the ESM print workforce (35%) are women. 
However, only 38% of the women working in the ESM print outlets under review hold senior 
positions and only 4% of senior ESM journalists are women. The survey shows that common 
perceptions of women media workers tended to reflect a lack of belief in women’s 
capabilities, a conviction that women are followers of men, and the understanding that 
women can be utilized as a useful tool to raise sympathy when they are portrayed as victims. 
Relying on discourse analysis of text and image, the report noted that women were portrayed 
as active players in the public sphere; as non-existent or confined to the private sphere; as 
victims or as objects of beauty, incapable of political involvement. In line with this trend, 
women are portrayed in some instances as active and in need of solidarity and partnership, 
but in many others as themselves in need of protection, sympathy, advice and help.   Most of 
our informants said that from 2012, they faced security challenges such as the fear of 
detention, being killed, or arresting family members. Later, militarization, masculinity and 
religious mindset limited the freedom of expression. Women also were faced with 
aggressiveness towards reputation and ridiculing any work related to gender concepts and 
gendering the Syrian media to force them stop their activism, especially when these women 
are in leading positions.  
A number of authors have noted that media production, generally speaking, is not 
gender neutral (for example, Ross and Carter 2011) and that media work is characterized by a 
number of patterns of gender inequality that relate to informality, autonomy and flexibility 
(Gill 2002). In Syria the patterns of gender inequality were fundamentally exacerbated by the 
protracted liminal state in Syria, which opened new fields of possibilities for regime and 
other counter-revolutionary forces to instrumentalize gender as a tool of war while engaging 
in gender-based violence to deter women from joining the opposition forces.10  These 
practices were also reiterated in official discourses about women, such as in the speeches of 
Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s wife Asma al-Assad in which she repeated the old 
Ba’thist discourse about what it means to be a good nationalist Syrian woman during the war 
against opponents. For example, in a speech on Mother’s Day on 21 March 2018, she said: 
“The Syrian heroines are those who defended Syria, postponed their dreams, left their 
families and put on military uniforms instead of wedding dresses….they carried the fun to 
defend the soil of their homeland” (al-Assad 2018).11 The instrumentalization of gender 
became a tool for several actors in the conflict, but most visibly in the regime’s use of gender 
as part of its narrative of Syria being in a grips of a crisis provoked by outsiders and ‘others’ 
in order to render its violence against Syrian people more comprehensible and acceptable As 
Szekely (2019: 2), writing about gender ideologies in the Syrian conflict, suggests:  
while gender ideology may not be the most important point of division in the conflict, 
it gives those involved an easy reference point to use in positioning themselves in 
relation to the other participants in the war, and to signal that position publicly. This is 
particularly useful in that such signalling represents a low-cost way of indicating an 
actor’s position in what is often a complex web of ideological divisions and alliances.  
  Conclusion 
The Syrian conflict is one of the most complex conflicts in contemporary history.12 The 
conflict, now in its eighth year, has been described as the most socially mediated war due to 
the excessive use by diverse actors of different media platforms to disseminate ideologies, 
political positionings and images of war and violence, and as the first networked conflict in 
contemporary history. Compared with other Arab uprisings and long-term conflicts in the 
Middle East, the conflict has featured spectacular forms of violence mediated through a wide 
range of digital and social media practices created by a variety of content by a host of 
political activists, witnesses, rebels, state agents, and soldiers, underlining how media are part 
of social and political processes and are fundamentally implicated in practices of war as well 
as the battle over ideologies, image, rhetoric, and politics.   
            Theorizing media and long-term conflicts such as Syria’s remains an elusive task. 
This chapter does not make grand claims as it has limited itself to using the optic of liminality 
to discuss alternative protest media and gendering processes and, in doing so, their potential 
for the redefinition, but also reinforcement, of social norms and gender distinctions.  
Liminality, in this sense, allows scholars to address the risks and opportunities for individuals 
and organizations alike during liminal times when subjects are ‘neither “in” nor “out”’ but are 
separated from familiar space, routine temporal order or hegemonic social structures. As 
such, liminality helps us understand lived experiences and actions and alert us to the potential 
and limitations of alternative media spaces during times of upheaval and constant 
transformation, such as the conflict in Syria. While much of the literature has focused on the 
agential role these spaces play, this chapter has suggested that liminality can affect the role 
alternative media spaces play because it is ambiguous and precarious and because it can both 
provide fields of possibilities for transgressive public acts in order to disrupt structure and 
social norms, including gender norms and practices, as well as fields of possibilities for the 
re-instatement of social norms and the re-institutionalization of structure by counter-
revolutionary forces. The approach taken here does not negate the role alternative media 
spaces have played in the Syrian war or its understanding, nor does it downplay the incredible 
bravery and agency of various Syrian actors in their opposition to entrenched systems of 
power. Rather, it has served to show the precarious conditions women media workers face 
during conflict and protracted conditions of liminality. Further research needs to be carried 
out on ideologies of gender in the Syrian conflict,13 particularly because gender has received 
less attention that other cleavages in the conflict, and particularly because gender continues to 
hold a central place in the constellation of narratives defining the Syrian conflict ecosystem 
and for those involved in and experiencing the conflict. 
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1 One of the key theoretical contributions of feminist theory is the concept of intersectionality 
which provides the language and framework for examining interconnections between social 
categories, such as gender, and systems and offers explanations of the ways in which diverse 
members of specific groups, such as women, might experience lived experiences and the 
work place differently, depending on their ethnicity, sexual orientation, class or other social 
markers. The term was coined by Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), in her work on the intersection 
of race and gender in relation to African Americans.  
2 Roughly 100 new Syrian media projects were established after March 2011, according to 
Syrian journalists working in them. There were as many as 298 newspapers being circulated 
in different parts of the country during various periods of the uprising, in addition to 17 state-
run or regime-affiliated newspapers (see Issa 2016). 
3 There is no space here to discuss imposed subjectivities in detail, but crucially the regime’s 
Ba’athist nationalist ideology constructed Syrian subjects as national Arab subjects and 
Syrian women invariably as women who served this ideology, (see, for example Wedeen 
(1999)).  
4 We follow Judith Butler (2004) in addressing norms as operating within social practices, 
and, as such, as providing implicit standards of normalization. 
5 Please see Enab Baladi’s website for further details at www.ennabbaladi.net, or to view their 
story in English: https://enabbaladi.org/en/.  
6 Most of the newspaper’s founders, including co-author Helmi, have fled Syria. Some of its 
journalists were arrested, some were released and one died under torture, according to Helmi. 
7 This is a phase during men acknowledged women’s role in general and particularly in 
reference to women’s role in mobilising non-violent movements and becoming citizens.   
 
8 The stage lasted until mid-2013 when different actors joined the battle for control of the 
country. For details about the conflict and its consequences, see (BBC News 2019). 
9 We follow Butler (2004: 42) in her argument that gender does not refer to “what one “is” 
nor to what one “has,” but as an apparatus by which the production and normalization of 
masculine and feminine take place along with the interstitial forms of hormonal, 
chromosomal, psychic, and performative that gender assumes.“ 
10 Gender violence in wartime is a complex phenomenon and is generally regarded as not 
only referring to social practices during ‘war’ as opposed to ‘peace’, but as happening on a 
continuum. For example, Cynthia Cockburn, in her study of the persistence of violence  
before, during and post-conflict, further  suggests there is a shift in discourse, especially in 
media representations,  prior to political violence or armed conflict and that this discourse can 
stoke the violence of national patriotism against a rival nation, point a finger at “the enemy 
within, or deepen the sense of ethnic belonging in opposition to some “other” from whom 
“we” are different and by whom our culture or our religion, our very existences, is 
threatened’ (Cockburn: 2004) 
11 PresidentAssad.net, 21 March. Available online: 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog
&id=165&Itemid=487 (accessed 30 September 2019). 
12 By the beginning of 2019, the Syrian conflict, had entered a phase marked by a broad 
consensus that the Assad regime had practically defeated its opponents, regained control of 
most opposition-held areas, and managed to sustain its long-standing mediated regime of 
representation. 
13 In the Syrian conflict, the Kurdish PYD and its armed wings have deployed an explicit 
inclusive position on women’s rights and participation, attracting widespread international 
media coverage of Kurdish women fighters. The role of women fighters has consistently been 
a central part of the party’s messaging in publicizing and promoting some military operations. 
Radical Islamist groups, such as Islamic State, also adopted ultra-conservative positions on 
women, issuing a memorandum on how Muslim women should do and act in the public and 
private space. As is the case for the PYD, IS’s beliefs about gender constitute a central 
feature of its ideology. The organization adheres to and promotes a set of explicit, 
prescriptive beliefs about the roles of women and men in society and has used the 
enforcement of those laws as a means of signifying its authority in the areas it controls 
